Introduction
In this study, Internet backbone traffic has been investigated with respect to potential security problems and many security-related anomalies in packet headers have been found. Internet traffic contains many erroneous packets; some are the result of software and hardware errors, other the result of intentional and malicious activities. We have searched for anomalies in contemporary, highly aggregated Internet backbone traffic. The results show that header problems can be found within almost every aspect being analyzed. In this study, 27.9 billion frames have been collected and protocol headers on network and transport layers have been analyzed in order to point out all behaviour that could potentially result in a security problem for connected hosts. As a result, a systematic listing of all possible packet header anomalies is provided, including their frequencies as seen "in the wild" on an Internet backbone link. In addition, the possible security implications of each anomaly observed are discussed.
The study of backbone traffic gives a complementary view to studies of traffic with low level of aggregation, such as traffic in local networks. Backbone data provides the opportunity to gain a broader 1/15 picture of different types of malicious traffic present on the modern Internet. Besides detection of various types of malicious traffic, specific attack patterns that never show up when studying traffic reaching a smaller network can be observed (e.g. distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks). Furthermore, rare attacks are more likely to be detected within large amounts of diverse and aggregated traffic and might therefore also reveal previously unreported attack types. Some traffic may seem legitimate when studying only one host but may turn out to be malicious when studying a larger portion of the Internet.
This study sets out to update and extend older studies (Bykova et al., 2001; John and Tafvelin, 2007; Mahoney and Chan, 2001) which have reported about packets not following modern Internet standards (IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP). Additionally, detailed figures about invalid use of fragmentation are included, which is an important security issue previously not covered in the same extent, with the exception of a study about general observations of fragmented traffic (Shannon et al., 2002) . While the previous studies only focus on some specific aspects, the present study presents a wider, systematic overview of the most commonly found misbehaviours on the modern Internet and how, and in what extent, common protocols are misused by attackers in their search for vulnerabilities in Internet-connected systems.
As a result, frequencies of occurrence for different kinds of malicious traffic are presented, such as invalid IP packets headers, incorrect use of IP fragmentation, IP address problems, ICMP, UDP and TCP misuse. In the search for anomalies, possible vulnerabilities are listed in table form with references to the packet headers, an approach which should make it easy to find potential problems and make it possible to evaluate the completeness of the study with respect to what header fields are being analyzed. Besides identification of header anomalies deviating from accepted Internet standards, particular well-known attacks and their common names (such as Land, Jolt, sPing, Teardrop, Boink, etc.) are pointed out in the tables and the analysis.
Many attacks like the ones described above are old and well-known and would therefore be expected to be very rare on the Internet and seemingly unlikely to be found in our data. However, the results of the study show that many of these attacks are still present on the Internet. One reason may be that the recent arrival of new operating systems and mobile devices with small and newly written IP stacks (e.g. mobile phones and PDAs) may have made these attacks meaningful again. A recent example of this was the introduction of Windows Vista, where it turned out that the beta versions were vulnerable to a large number of such old well-known vulnerabilities (Newsham and Hoagland, 2006) . This study shows that it is possible to detect many commonly known attacks from an analysis of network and transport layer packet headers. We therefore believe that our approach to identify potential problems and the scale of our datasets allow us to classify, detect and report a substantial portion of malicious, incorrect and unwanted traffic present on the Internet today. The results of this study should not only be interesting for practitioners and researchers but should also be valuable input for work with intrusion detection systems, firewalls and support the design of all kinds of networked applications that must withstand network attacks.
Limitations
In our study, it has not always been possible to correlate all packets or to find all series of packets belonging to a malicious activity. There may also be other limitations. The Smurf and Fraggle attacks, for example, are attacks where ICMP and UDP packets are sent to a network's broadcast address. However, on the Internet backbone there exists no information about what addresses are used for local broadcast messages on smaller networks. Another limitation is that application-level data was removed immediately after data collection making it impossible to inspect the contents of the packets in order to validate, for example, DNS queries or to find problems in application level protocols. Finally, another group of attacks are link-level attacks such as ARP attacks which, of course, are not visible on the Internet and cannot be detected with this type of study. However, we strongly believe that these limitations do not affect the usefulness of this study in any significant way.
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Outline of the paper
Section 2 describes possible anomalies in IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP headers. Different types of anomalies are divided into classes and possible security implications of each type of anomaly are highlighted. In Section 3, the real-life dataset used for the analysis is presented together with the methodology applied. Section 4 provides figures about occurrences of anomalies in the dataset according to the classification scheme presented in Section 2. Besides the figures, each anomaly is discussed and interpreted regarding its security implications. Section 5 concludes the study, highlights the main findings and gives recommendations for how to use the results.
Classification of anomalies
In order to provide a systematic overview of possible header misbehaviours and to ease the reading of this paper, the headers of the protocols being analyzed are shown in fig. 1-4 (IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP headers). Header fields highlighted in grey are considered to contain potentially unusual or harmful values and are therefore included in this study. Roman numbers in the figures indicate different types of anomalies within the header fields and the tables below provide descriptions of each anomaly. This type of classification makes it possible to identify all packets violating Internet standards in any way. The motivations for investigating many of the anomalies can be found in the right column of the tables. 
Data description and methodology
The dataset used in this study (John and Tafvelin, 2006) was collected from September to November 2006 on an OC192 backbone link of the Swedish University Network (SUNET). The packet header traces have been collected on a highly aggregated backbone link at 277 randomly selected times during 80 days, in order to provide a good statistical representation of all Internet traffic during the time-period at this location. At each randomly selected time, two traces of 10 minutes duration were stored. When recording the packet level traces on the 2x10GB links, payload beyond transport layer was removed and IP addresses were anonymized due to privacy concerns using the prefix preserving CryptoPAN (Xu et al., 2001 ). After
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further pre-processing of the traces as described in (John and Tafvelin, 2006) and (John and Tafvelin, 2007) , the traces were moved to a central storage. An analysis program was run on the raw traces to extract malformed packet headers and invalid series of fragments. The reduced data was then stored in a database together with statistical summaries for each particular observation as listed in Section 2. For packets of special interest, corresponding flows have been extracted from the raw traces and analyzed in detail using available packet visualization software.
The complete dataset consists of 554 traces including 27.9 billion frames. 99.98% of the traffic was IPv4 carrying 19.5 TB of data in 636 million flows. During the single 10 minute intervals, depending on time of day, between 13,000 and 37,000 unique IP addresses were observed belonging to the region of western Sweden connecting to 300,000-1,000,000 unique addresses on the main Internet. A breakdown of transport protocols in the IP traffic is summarized in Table 1 . Not only numbers and fractions of packets are shown but also IP fragments and fragment series are listed (first three lines). The analysis of fragmented traffic requires correlation of fragmented IP packets to create fragment series. Following Shannon (Shannon et al., 2002) , a fragment series has been defined as a list of fragments observed on the network derived from a single original IP packet. Consequently, fragments have been grouped into fragment series based on the IP ID, protocol and the source and destination IP fields. Furthermore a timeout value of one second was chosen to further separate fragment series. As opposed to the study by Shannon et al. (2002) which was carried out on OC12 links, the timeout had to be chosen smaller in order to compensate for the higher throughput of the links measured (OC192). In rare cases, wraparounds of the IP ID space have been observed within a few seconds, which made such a small timeout necessary. Considering the transmission rates of modern computers, a timeout of one second seems to be sufficient to capture all fragments belonging to a certain series, which was proven to be true by a number of empirical tests on the dataset. Furthermore, fragment series observed in the first or the last second of a measurement interval have not been tested for completeness, in order to avoid bias due to border effects.
Earlier studies have shown that only 0.06% of the traffic was fragmented on the measured network (John and Tafvelin, 2007) . The increased fraction of IP fragments in the dataset used for this study (0.9%) is explained by a special bulk data transfer event from a space observatory to a data centre in Europe. During 7 time intervals, 213 million fragments in 9.4 million fragment series have been transferred on the outgoing link using a customized fast bulk transfer protocol based on UDP. Figures for the remaining fragmented traffic without the mentioned bulk transfer are summarized in the final two rows of Table 1 . Disregarding this special event, only about 0.15% of the IPv4 traffic was fragmented.
Observed misbehaviours and anomalies
In the following subsections, occurrences of the anomalies classified in Section 2 as seen in our dataset, are presented in tables. The index columns use the same Roman numbers as introduced earlier. For IP level anomalies a transport protocol breakdown is provided as well. Each table is followed by remarks and 6/15 discussions about the anomalies being observed, including an interpretation and discussion of their probable causes.
IP header anomalies I -IV:
Packets with an insufficient actual packet length to carry the minimal IP and transport headers (I) have been seen very rarely, originating from different IP addresses at different times. 105 of these packets also announced insufficient sizes in the IP total length field (IV). IP version numbers not agreeing with the HDLC Ethertype (II) or IPv4 header length fields smaller than 20 (III) have not been seen at all. Since these errors rarely happen and no well-known attacks exploit such anomalies, we believe these packets are caused by rare IP stack errors.
V: Packets with a source IP address equal to the destination address, as used in the Land attack, have been seen 321 times. The original land attack was based on TCP SYN packets which has been observed 9 times in the dataset. Most packets with this anomaly are UDP segments, which means that they are modified versions of Land. (John and Tafvelin, 2007) . All possible bit combinations have been seen, with MF+DF responsible for 99% of the invalid combinations. Most IP packets with invalid flag values carry UDP traffic, but no source or destination hosts or port numbers stand out. Furthermore, such packets are seen within each of the 277 traces, with a few traces carrying relatively large numbers of up to 10% of the packets. We believe that these packets are mainly forged packets by hacker tools like nmap in order to test robustness of implementations. Furthermore, in a previous study (John and Tafvelin, 2007) also erroneous IP stack implementations have been found to contribute to this behaviour. Many Unix systems use UDP packets with varying size of around 40 bytes for traceroute with a destination port within the otherwise uncommon port range 33434 to (around) 33534. 92% of the UDP packets with short TTL fall into this port range and since they are small in packet size, they are most likely legitimate traceroute packets. The remaining 8% UDP packets are not only directed to other random port numbers, they also have larger packet sizes between 100 and 1500 bytes, which indicates that they must be treated as suspicious.
Most of the TCP packets with small TTL values are the downstream part of regular TCP connections. They also show TTL values of 8 or 9 which is larger than the traceroute traffic observed for ICMP and UDP (TTL values of 3, 5 or 6 for this specific topology), which consequently is too large for topology mapping scans. These remote hosts are therefore most likely running a system with a small default TTL value, such as Windows NT or 95. This leaves about 5300 packets to be suspected as topology mapping scans via TCP (suitable TTL values with small packets).
Additional 55,500 packets of protocol type 103 (PIM-protocol independent multicast) have been observed with TTL values of exactly one -which are valid PIM bootstrapping messages following RFC 2362.
XV, XVI:
As already observed in a previous study (John and Tafvelin, 2007) , IP options are rarely used. Source routing is the main security concern regarding IP options, but has not been observed at all (neither IP option value 131 nor 137). A large part of the packets with IP options is sent by 10 sources to one destination inside Gothenburg via UDP. Strangely, instead of using real options, a sequence of four EOOL bytes is sent (0,0,0,0) which is most likely due to inappropriate configuration or buggy software. The options used by ICMP traffic are of valid option type 7 (record route), and the remaining 948 IP options observed are option type 148 (router alert) being sent within RSVP packets. IP option header length inconsistencies (XVI) have not been observed.
4.2.IP fragmentation anomalies
The figures of IP fragmentation anomalies in the dataset used are skewed due to one exceptional event, where exactly one host inside a University was sending UDP segments fragmented into 6-7 fragments to five different hosts at five different measurement times during a few days, in very high frequency. As destination port number, the entire 16 bit port space was used in iterative fashion. About 50% of the IP series included different types of inconsistencies, most with missing last fragments, but also other gaps and a number of "single packet series". Most likely this is a hijacked host used for directed DoS attacks (such as a Frag attack). The 1.6 million fragment series from this host have been summarized in the first row of Table 3 and are excluded from the remaining analysis. VIII: About 81,000 packets appear to be part of a fragment series (either MF bit or fragment offset set), but no other fragments are observed for the same series. This could potentially be used to confuse hosts or firewalls. Another plausible explanation is that further fragments have been dropped or routed asymmetrically. Around 10% of the single-packet series used IP IDs of zero, which means that IDs of zero are around 1,500 times more common than any other possible number in the 16-bit space. This obvious over-representation of one IP ID is suspicious and indicates either malicious intentions or usage of protocol implementations not following Internet standards. 58% of the single fragment series have the MF bit set and are full sized packets (~1500 bytes), looking like typical first packets in fragment series. The remaining 42% have characteristic properties of last packets in fragment series, with IP offset values set and small data portions. These observations suggest that dropped packets could be an explanation for many of these packets.
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IX:
Incomplete fragment series are very undesirable because they consume resources at the receiving host which needs to store the arriving fragments until the series is complete and the entire packet can be handed over to the next protocol layer. Known attack types in this category are Opentear and Frag. Around 50% of incomplete fragment series are missing the last fragment, a missing first fragment accounts for 25% and the remaining 25% are gaps in between. In the dataset, 42 hosts receive about 80% of all the incomplete series. The incomplete series are sent by different hosts and are targeted to random UDP ports. The sizes of the gaps range from 8(!) bytes to full packet size. Besides these incomplete series, valid series of fragments are also sent to the hosts in question and only around 1/5 of all fragment series are actually incomplete. Even though this behaviour could be explained by a high number of packet losses along the path, a suspiciously high density of IP IDs of zero together with the unusual gap size of 8 bytes makes it more likely that these hosts are the target of a DDoS attack by a number of bots, similar to the hijacked host causing the exceptional event described above.
X:
Overlapping fragments are also known to be a common DoS attack type (such as Teardrop, Jolt and Nestea). Overlaps are very rare in the dataset and only 37 occurrences have been observed at 35 times between different hosts, mainly UDP. Almost all series with overlaps (35) also include missing sections in the complete IP datagram. The small overlapping fragments (8 to 48 bytes) have exactly the same size as the gaps in the specific series, but they fill the gaps at the wrong offset. Depending on the length of the series, such overlapping fragments appear up to 3 times per series, with the last byte of the overlapping fragment always at the datagram offset of 912, 1832 and 5352 bytes. We believe that this consistent behaviour is either the result of a soft-or hardware error or an attack tool repeating the same behaviour.
XI:
In contrast to overlaps, duplicate fragments mean that two fragments cover the exact same portion (offset and fragment length) within the fragmented datagram. Potentially, this could cause similar problems as overlaps in Teardrop attacks, namely overwriting previous benign portions with new malicious data. Since packet payload in our dataset has been removed, we need to rely on transport header checksum 9/15 information (note that transport header checksums in fragment series are only available in the first fragment, so changed payload in following fragments cannot be detected in the present study 
4.3.TCP header anomalies
In the first row of 
XVIII:
The reserved bits in the TCP header are the four bits following the TCP header length field. The previously six reserved bits have been reduced to four since the introduction of ECN (RFC 3168). In this study, the ECN bits have not been considered. According to the TCP specification (RFC 793) the reserved bits must be zero. However, almost 115,000 packets with non-zero reserved bits have been observed in the dataset. Interestingly, TCP reserved bits are only set together with TCP flag combinations of either RST/ACK or SYN/ACK. 21% of the invalid reserved bits have all 4 bits set and appear consistently with RST/ACK packets. These RST/ACK packets are mainly replies from HTTP servers on port 80. Valid TCP conversations are closed by the servers with sequences of 3-4 RST/ACK packets, where each but the initial RST/ACK has all reserved bits set. This appears to be an incorrect TCP implementation rather than a security issue.
The remaining 79% of TCP headers with invalid reserved bits appear within SYN/ACK packets only, but this time with different bit combinations. These SYN/ACKs are sent in high frequency by different sources, usually from port 80 or 7000. Interestingly, no SYN packets triggering these SYN/ACK responses and no further packets originating from these sources have been seen. This behaviour can either be explained by an asymmetrically routed (and therefore un-captured) SYN attack, but more likely are SYN/ACK attacks. In this case the often used source port of 80 can be explained by attempts to pass certain stateless firewalls.
XIX: TCP port number zero is reserved and should not be used for data transfer. Nevertheless, 6,180 TCP segments with a port number of zero have been observed equally shared between source and destination port numbers. These segments have been sent by approximately 700 different sources within almost all measurement intervals. Most of these packets are SYN packets being part of host scanning campaigns. Very few of them are actually replied to with RST/ACK packets.
XX:
Anomalies within the 6-bit TCP flags field have been divided into invalid combinations of the signalling flags SYN, FIN and RST (XXa) and another, less critical, but still unexpected flag value (XXb).
XX a:
Combinations of invalid signalling flags appear in frequencies comparable to observations in an earlier study (John and Tafvelin, 2007) . 826 segments had no signalling flags set at all (zero flags). The combination RST+FIN in the same header has been observed 939 times, SYN+FIN 435 times and 377 segments had SYN+FIN+RST set. The most common flag anomaly however is RST+FIN with more than 176,000 occurrences. Packets with invalid signalling flag combinations have been seen evenly distributed within all traces, sent by more than 45,000 hosts to different destinations where approximately 50% are directed to port 80. The most likely explanation for such segments is crafted packets (such as X-mas) by network exploration and testing tools like nmap.
XX b:
Beside combinations of signalling flags, another type of unexpected flag values has been observed. According to the TCP specification, every segment in an established TCP connection (except the initial SYN) is required to carry an ACK, so there is no reason for pure FIN packets to exist. Mahoney (Mahoney and Chan, 2001) showed that identification of FIN packets without an ACK can reveal port-sweeps and OS fingerprinting campaigns. In our dataset, 82,000 segments with only FIN flags set have been observed, sent by 10,000 different hosts to 27,000 destinations. Interestingly, more than 50% of these packets are sent to different well known P2P ports. Most pure FIN packets are sent after a sequence of SYN connection attempts just before the socket is finally closed on the sending host after the TCP timeout. Even if this behaviour is not defined in the standards, we do not consider it to be security relevant.
XXII:
According to RFC 793, it is not prohibited to append payload data to SYN packets. However, this behaviour is de facto non standard and therefore somewhat suspicious. The only well defined usage of SYN packets with data is T/TCP (RFC 1644) which can be identified by TCP options. However, this has not been observed in this dataset. Around 29,000 SYN packets with data had a data portion of exactly 24 bytes and have been sent to TCP port 53 (DNS). These packets are seen quite evenly distributed among all measurement times and are exchanged between about 113 different IP addresses outside the region of Gothenburg to 66 hosts inside. The connections are initialized by this SYN data segment, replied by a SYN/ACK and then immediately closed by the initiator with a RST. According to SANS Intrusion Detection FAQ (SANS, 2008) this behaviour has been observed in other networks and is probably caused by a common but buggy DNS system. Other segments with SYN flags and data have only been observed in packets with garbled TCP headers.
XXIII: TCP sequence and acknowledgement numbers use 32-bit integers. Even if the selection of initial sequence numbers (ISN) is known not to be completely random for many systems (Zalewski, 2002) , 390,000 out of 25 billion segments having an ACK number of zero is a clear overrepresentation. It turned out that 96% of these packets are RST/ACK segments. A large portion of these segments is sent by hosts 11/15
closing valid connections with series of RST/ACK packets. In these connections, all but the initial RST/ACK packets carried an ACK number of zero, which appears to be an implementation problem rather than malicious activity. In addition, some RST/ACK storms have been observed with no SYN packets that could have triggered these replies. This behaviour could be explained by an asymmetrically routed (and therefore un-captured) SYN attack, but more likely as RST/ACK attacks where the ACK number field was left empty (zeros). The remaining ACK numbers of zero (4%) are pure ACK packets sent between a large number of hosts, thus there is no indication of obvious malicious intentions.
XXIV: Urgent pointers are basically a valid way to transmit "out of band" data within the regular TCP stream of a connection, used e.g. for quick delivery of control strings in applications like telnet or ftp. However, in the past urgent pointers have turned out to be an effective way for DoS attacks due to buggy operating systems (WinNuke) -regardless of the actual value of the urgent pointer. This means that many firewalls today drop all packets with urgent pointer flags. In the dataset, 3,389 TCP segments carried an URG flag, though none of these packets were directed to port 139, the target of the infamous original WinNuke attack. Most of the URG segments had generally garbled TCP headers and only 440 "pure" URG flags have been observed. 71 of these packets have been sent to port 21 (ftp) with plausible urgent pointer values of 2 -4 (e.g. for control characters like "ctrl-c"). The remaining pure URG segments have been sent to different P2P port numbers with urgent pointer values of one or zero. Especially urgent pointers pointing to a data offset of zero are suspicious since it indicates that there is in fact no data to deliver urgently.
XXV -XXVII:
TCP option anomalies in this dataset have been observed in frequencies comparable to results of a previous study (John and Tafvelin, 2007) . Three different anomalies (XXV-XXVII) have been observed in different combinations within 9,000 TCP segments. Such packets are most likely crafted by tools like nmap. The most common inconsistencies are either usage of undefined option types (TCP options are only defined for type numbers up to 26) and length announcements in the length field of specific options which do not agree with the header length of the general TCP header. Additionally, 967 options carried an option length value of zero which has been shown to cause endless loops when processing them in receivers and traffic filters (e.g. Symantec Personal Firewall).
4.4.UDP header anomalies
Index # packets Description XVII 67 UDP length field XIX 17,242 UDP port zero Only two packets announced header length of one and two, which is too small to carry the minimum UDP header length of 8 bytes. The low frequency of this anomaly does not allow us to reliably classify this as a malicious action.
XIX:
As for TCP, UDP port numbers of zero are also reserved. In the dataset, around 3,000 UDP segments have been sent to UDP port zero, which is definitely not permitted and can lead to crashes of hosts or firewalls. According to the UDP specification (RFC 768) the source port number field is optional and may be set to zero if not used, i.e. no reply is expected. A large portion of about 14,000 packets has been seen with source port values of zero. Even if this behaviour per se is permissible, it turned out that all the segments coming from UDP port zero are sent in short scanning campaigns, scanning over ranges of /24 networks (254 IP addresses) on port numbers 1025 and 1026 (win-rpc The large number of ICMP redirects is caused by two hosts sending about 46 million ICMP packets with type 5, code 1 (host redirect) to 300,000 destinations during the measurement intervals within a period of 12 days. The general behaviour of these hosts clearly shows that they are not routers or gateways but rather normal workstations establishing only connections to HTTP and P2P hosts. Most likely, these packets are part of a DoS attack like Winfreez, which can cause windows machines to change their routing tables. Unfortunately, missing packet payload makes it impossible to analyze the announced gateway addresses in the redirect messages observed.
ICMP timestamp attacks, like Moyari13
, cannot be identified since the timestamp information has not been preserved in the dataset. However, all timestamp messages (type 13 and 14) have valid packet lengths. Furthermore, all except three timestamp messages (type 13) have immediately been replied to (type 14), which does not indicate malicious behaviour.
Undefined ICMP types and codes could potentially be part of Twinge or Trash attacks, which cycle through all types and codes, thereby trying to create confusion or crash certain operating systems. The 33,517 packets with random types and codes in the dataset have been sent between a couple of thousand hosts quite evenly distributed among all trace intervals, with no host or time interval standing out, which means that at least large scale campaigns of these attacks have not been observed.
Finally, a quite large number of packets with valid types but invalid packet lengths have been observed. According to RFC 792 (ICMP), most messages except echo have well defined packet sizes or are at least bound to a maximum (often 56 bytes including 20 bytes IP header, 8 bytes ICMP header, 20 bytes original IP header and up to 8 bytes of original payload). Almost all ICMP packets with invalid lengths are of type 3 (destination unreachable) and the remaining 2% are of type 11 (time exceeded), having packet sizes exceeding 56 bytes. Since a large number of hosts were sending these packets in small frequencies, it is likely that most of these are the result of implementations with wrong interpretation of the ICMP standard. Only three ICMP messages have been observed with insufficient IP packet lengths to host an ICMP header.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we first provide a systematic classification of header fields not following Internet specifications with a potential to cause security problems. This systematic classification serves as a starting point for identification of such header inconsistencies within our large dataset consisting of packet header data collected on a contemporary, highly aggregated Internet backbone link with diverse traffic composition. Occurrences of each header anomaly as observed "in the wild" are then presented followed by detailed discussions about possible causes and an interpretation of the observations with respect to security relevance.
As a general observation, it is surprising to see that that many old, well known attacks can still be found. On the upside, some former popular attacks, such as Ping-of-death and the IP source route exploit have not been observed at all. Generally, a constant "noise" of malformed or inconsistent packet headers was observed, similar and consistent with the observations of constant scanning activities in another recent connection-level study . This type of background noise is in some cases likely to be caused by rare hardware and software errors, but most must be attributed to the possibilities even inexperienced hackers have today to generate more or less random packet headers with existing networking tools.
Also a number of exceptional events of malicious activity have been observed. An ICMP DoS attack with otherwise unsuspicious echo reply messages has been identified due to IP address analysis regarding reserved IP spaces. A sequence of fragmented datagrams has been sent in high intensity from a single host during short time intervals. The detailed analysis of the fragment series revealed a directed Frag attack, using incomplete fragment series with the intention to exhaust resources at the receivers. Furthermore, an analysis of IP ID values of zero appeared to be a successful approach to detect different fragmentation anomalies, and observations in the reserved bits field of the TCP header revealed a series of SYN/ACK attacks. Port number values of zero proved to be effective in detecting port scanning campaigns, both for TCP and for UDP. Finally, a DoS attack applying ICMP redirect messages has been observed.
There are many interesting future research possibilities to improve the results and insights of this study, such as a complementary flow-level investigation of scanning traffic or a similar packet inspection including at least some application-level data, to name but a few. However, the results of this study show that it is possible to detect a substantial part of malicious activities just from inspection of header data. The observations also show that inspection of IP addresses spaces, IP ID values, port number values, the entire flags section in the TCP header (reserved bits and signalling flags) and ICMP messages are the most 14/15 effective mechanisms to find malicious traffic and therefore form a basic set of rules which should be included into all modern firewall and IDS systems.
The results presented here are based on a rare dataset of aggregated backbone traffic and are intended to guide and support network administrators and application developers in their constant task of tuning their systems in order to mitigate the wide range of incoming malicious attack traffic. Furthermore, we believe that this study helps researchers and practitioners to gain a better understanding of the characteristics of today's Internet traffic in order to remain proactive.
